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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of systemic risk using dy-
namic panel data regressions, because they allow controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity and omitted variables, decreasing the bias in the coefficient es-
timates. Additionally, it analyzes the recurrence of high systemic risk events
using a duration models approach, in which the time spent in a state of
financial stability is probabilistically characterized, as well as the transition
probability to an unstable state, in which systemic risk is high. Moreover,
it suggests that the expected duration of financial stability can be used as a
leading index for systemic risk.
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1. Introduction
Financial markets are interconnected as a consequence of linkages be-
tween financial institutions, which represent an efficient risk sharing mech-
anism. However, financial crises arise and an important cause is the occur-
rence of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks affecting the financial system which,
through a contagion mechanism spread across institutions throughout the
same linkages that in stable periods embodies strength. Thus, systemic risk
is the risk suffered by the whole financial system because the risk of in-
dividual institutions is transmitted across the system through a contagion
mechanism.
Systemic risk is a cyclical phenomenon because banks are beaten by liq-
uidity shocks that arise in response to fluctuations of the business cycle.
However, a financially healthy bank should be able to resist the shocks’
adverse effects, while banks which take higher risks should suffer a severe
negative impact. If a bank is greatly affected by the shock, then the shock
is transmitted to other banks, unleashing a contagion event. Therefore sys-
temic risk depends on aggregate variables that affect the whole system, as
well as on characteristics of each bank that makes it more or less vulnerable
to shocks.
Given that systemic risk is cyclical and also depends on characteristics of
each bank, then some banks would be suffering states of financial instability
more frequently than others. Then, the probability of occurrence of systemic
risk events can be characterized in function of both: characteristics of the
economy and the banks. Based on this observation, this paper proposes to
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use a duration models approach to probabilistically characterize the time
spent by a bank in a state of financial stability, as well as the transition
probability to an unstable state, in which systemic risk is high (financial
distress).
This paper has two objectives. In the first place to analyze the determi-
nants of systemic risk proposed by literature, empirically verifying the effect
of these variables over a measure of systemic risk. Thus, it can be determined
which variables have a more important effect over systemic risk (and which
variables do not have effect over systemic risk). Second, it proposes to use
the expected duration of banks in a state of financial stability, conditional
on the determinants of risk, as a leading index for systemic risk. An index
like this would allow implementing policies to stabilize the financial system
and prevent contagion events.
The database contains quarterly data of publicly traded banks in the
US, during the period 1992Q1-2010Q4. This information was collected from
the FDIC and Federal Reserve databases. The quarterly series for the sys-
temic risk variable, ∆CoV aR, was provided by Adrian and Brunnermeier,
its original authors.
I analyzed the determinants of risk using dynamic panel data regressions
because they allow controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and omitted
variables, decreasing the bias in the coefficient estimates. The key assump-
tion is that the lagged dependent variables capture the effect of omitted
variables varying in time and across banks, like the number of interconnec-
tions of a bank, which could increase as the bank grows, making it risky for
the system.
Then I analyzed the duration of financial stability using a Cox propor-
tional hazard model and the determinants of systemic risk as covariates. The
survivor function of a bank is constructed on the basis of the hazard rate
(the Cox regression outcome), and then the expected duration is calculated.
Finally, I showed how the expected duration of financial stability of a
bank could be used as a leading index for systemic risk. A regulatory body
like the central bank could monitor the expected duration of stability, pay-
ing particular attention to banks with a low expected duration (or rapidly
decaying expected duration) to take preventive measures, for example, in-
jecting liquidity into troubled banks or the whole financial system (acting
as a lender of last resort), avoiding the emergence of a contagion which may
end affecting a larger fraction of the financial system.
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 is a brief literature review of
systemic risk (mechanisms and determinants); section 3 describes the data
used in the empirical analysis; section 4 describes the methodology used for
identifying the determinants of systemic risk; section 5 shows the results of
the estimations; section 6 describes the duration analysis methodology and
shows the results of estimations; section 7 shows how the expected duration
can be used as a leading index for systemic risk; section 8 summarizes the
results and concludes.
2. Economics of systemic risk
This section describes some models that explain the systemic risk phe-
nomenon, which it is defined as the risk suffered by the whole financial system
because the risk of individual institutions is transmitted across the system
through a contagion mechanism. The objective is to identify the mechanisms
and variables that characterize systemic risk. Later these variables will be
empirically tested.
Allen and Gale (2000) proposed a model to explain the financial conta-
gion mechanism, in which banks face liquidity shocks and the cross holdings
of deposits provide insurance against them; however, the linkages between
banks also produce financial fragility because the shocks can spread across
the system through the same interconnections. Depositors interpret signals
that deliver information about the state of the business cycle, and when they
receive information about an imminent recession they anticipate that banks
could have financial distress, and try to withdraw their deposits causing liq-
uidity shocks. Banks frequently face liquidity shocks, so they get insurance
against them through an interbank market, holding deposits in other banks.
If the shock is too big, the affected bank collapses and the other banks lose
the deposits that hold in the failed bank. The contagion process starts in
this way. The degree of financial fragility depends on the structure of the
interbank network, that is, the number of interconnections between banks.
Alternatively, Freixas et al. (2000) propose a model in which intercon-
nections between banks enhance the resilience of the system to get over the
insolvency of a particular bank, but they are also a source of contagion. This
model is similar to Allen and Galle model, but the emphasis is in “where” the
shocks arise instead on “when”. They also give fundamentals to the “too-big-
to-fail” policy, that is, the concern for stabilizing banks that in case of failing
would produce a high systemic risk and contagion, since they are playing a
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key role in the interbank network. Nier et al. (2008) analyze this network
theories about contagion using simulated banking systems.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009) propose a macroeconomic model with
financial sector, in which financial stability depends on the business cycle,
but the financial sector activity, in turn, amplifies the business cycles. The
risk is endogenous because the investors assume high leverage ratios in stable
periods since prices rise endogenously, so their assets value rises too. In the
same way they choose their capital ratios to be able to withstand reasonable
losses. However, part of the risk is exogenous, in the form of shocks affecting
the financial system. If shocks are too large, the investors will not be able
to withstand losses, which will translate into a fall in prices. Then the
leverage ratios chosen by investors will growth endogenously, intensifying the
instability in the financial system. Paradoxically, the low endogenous risk
in stable periods makes the financial system vulnerable to volatility crises,
phenomenon the authors call volatility paradox. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) also propose a model relating economic cycle and financial stability,
and Adrian and Shin (2010) provide empirical evidence for this phenomenon.
Summarizing, the determinants identified on the basis of these works are:
Business cycle variables, that are signals about the state of the business
cycle, which modify the depositors’ expectations. When signals are negative
depositors expect that the banks will not be able to honor its debt, and
respond withdrawing their deposits. When many depositors act in the same
way, this situation turns into a liquidity shock affecting the bank or the whole
financial system.
Liquidity, since banks are intrinsically fragile due to its function of sup-
plying liquidity to the economy, which is demanded by risk-averse depositors.
Banks receive liquid deposits that can be withdrawn when depositors wish,
while invest in illiquid long term assets with a higher return but when are
liquidated early produce losses. A bank invests in a portfolio of short and
long term maturity assets, according to its estimation about the aggregate
risk (fraction of depositors who withdraw in the short and long term). A
liquidity shock makes that an unexpected number of depositors wish to with-
draw their deposits, producing losses in the bank because it has to liquidate
the long term assets at discount to satisfy the unexpected demand for liquid-
ity. If the shock is big enough the bank goes bankrupt, and all its assets are
liquidated at discount, with the consequence that other banks with deposits
in the distressed one suffer losses too, situation that can trigger a conta-
gion process. If a bank has good liquidity ratios, that is, if the bank has
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enough short term assets to satisfy any unexpected demand, it will be less
systemically risky.
Leverage, as Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009) point out that investors
(including banks) choose leverage ratios endogenously during stable periods
of growth due to upward distortions in assets prices, that in turn distort the
leverage ratios. The larger leverage makes the banks prone to instability pe-
riods, because their returns become volatile, so they are exposed to financial
insolvency. In deceleration or recessive periods this effect is larger because
the fall in prices endogenously makes grow the leverage ratios.
Size, since financial contagion is produced because the losses suffered by
a bank spread to other banks through the interconnections between them. A
larger bank produces a larger loss in the financial system, because the amount
of assets liquidated at discount is larger, and also because the contagion is
wider, since a larger bank should have a large number of interconnections
with other banks. Regarding size and interconnections, authors like Freixas
et al. (2000) and Chan-Lau (2010) argue that more important than the size
of a bank is how interconnected is.
The number of interconnections of a bank is an important determinant
of systemic risk, since when a bank with a large number of interconnections
is affected by a liquidity shock, it will transmit only small shocks to each of
the banks in its structure, dissipating the shock’s negative effect. However,
if the shock is big enough the initial spread could turn into a contagion to a
large number of banks.
3. Data
3.1. Systemic risk variable
There are alternative methods to measure systemic risk. For example,
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) define the banking system as a portfolio of
banks and infer the multivariate density of the system using individual risk
probabilities as exogenous variables. Then they estimate financial stability
measures, like the joint probability of financial distress or conditional prob-
abilities of distress. Chan-Lau (2010) describes a method to analyze the risk
arising from direct exposures related with the balance sheets of institutions.
This method allows analyzing how the shocks affecting an institution spread
across the banking system, using counterfactual simulations. Then he ob-
tains indexes like the total bankruptcies (or the total capital losses) induced
by the bankruptcy of a particular institution. Another papers addressing
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network analysis literature are Nier et al. (2008) and Upper (2011). Huang
et al. (2012) propose a systemic risk indicator measured by the price of insur-
ance against systemic financial distress, based on credit default swap (CDS)
prices. Billio et al. (2012) propose several econometric measures of con-
nectedness based on principal-components analysis and Granger-causality
networks.
I chose to use the measure of systemic risk proposed by Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2009). They suggest a measure called ∆CoV aR, that captures the
marginal contribution of a particular institution i to overall systemic risk.
The ∆CoV aRj|i, is the difference between the financial system VaR (insti-
tution j) conditional to an institution i being in distress (5% VaR), and
the financial system VaR conditional to the same institution i in the me-
dian state of its return distribution (50% VaR). The authors also interpret
the ∆CoV aR as the difference between the maximum percentage loss in the
system assets value when a particular institution is in the median state of
returns (50%) and when it is in an extreme state (5%)1.
An advantage of this measure is that different measures of risk can be
used as exogenous variable (not necessarily the value at risk, VaR), which
is good because in many countries the quality and/or quantity of available
data is limited. Besides, many measures can be constructed, like the con-
tribution of a particular institution to systemic risk, the contribution of an
institution to another institution risk, and the contribution of the system to
an institution risk. For example, Wong and Fong (2011) estimate CoV aR to
study the interconnections between the financial systems of 11 Asia-Pacific
economies, and Gauthier et al. (2012) estimate systemic risk exposures for
the Canadian banking system.
The quarterly series for 5%∆CoV aR was provided by Adrian and Brun-
nermeier, the original authors. The sample has 1,194 financial institutions
and 100 quarters, between 1986Q1 and 2012Q4. All of the institutions are
publicly traded in capital markets. Figure 1 shows this series and table 1
displays its descriptive statistics.
Table 2 shows the recessive periods in the US during the sample period. A
recessive period is the interval between the highest and the lowest point of a
cycle. Figure 1 shows these intervals in shaded areas. Two of three recessions
can be associated with periods of high systemic risk, so systemic risk would
1The ∆CoV aR is estimated using quantile regressions, a method introduced by
Koenker and Hallock (2001)
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Table 1: DeltaCoVaR(5)
Mean 0.0010
Std.Deviation 0.0003
5th percentile 0.0007
25th percentile 0.0008
Median 0.0009
75th percentile 0.0012
95th percentile 0.0015
be countercyclical, it rises in recessive periods. The exception is the second
recessive period, between 2001Q1 and 2001Q4, since there is a decrease of
systemic risk during the interval. Respecting the historical context, the first
recession (1990Q2-1991Q1) was a consequence of the 1987 financial crisis.
Even though the financial markets recovered quickly, banks were too beaten
and recovered slowly, so the credit supply of the economy was affected. The
second recession (2001Q1-2001Q4) is the period after the Nasdaq crisis (dot-
com bubble). The Nasdaq Stock Market reached its maximum market value
in March 2000, and then steadily declined for 18 months. The third recession
(2007Q4-2009Q2) started as a result of the bursting of the real estate bubble
during 2007.
Table 2: Recessions in the US (Source: NBER)
Highest point Lowest point
1990Q2 1991Q1
2001Q1 2001Q4
2007Q4 2009Q2
Table 3: Financial crises
Crisis Period
Black monday 1987Q3
Oil price shock 1990Q3
Asian financial crisis 1997Q3
Nasdaq crisis 2000Q1
Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 2008Q3
Table 3 shows the dates of financial crises during the sample period, and
figure 1 shows its dates of occurrence through vertical lines. The first one
was the “Black Monday”, when stocks markets around the world crashed
one by one through a contagion mechanism that began in Hong Kong. The
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next was the Asian financial crisis, in 1997, affecting the price of curren-
cies, and then the Nasdaq crisis, after the bursting of the “dot-com bubble”
in 2000. Finally the crisis associated to the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US in that moment, and the
largest bankruptcy in the US history. Systemic risk appears to rise before
and mainly after financial crises. The relation between financial crises and
systemic risk is more evident than the relation with recessions, but it is not
causal because systemic risk grows since before the start of a crisis. However,
the occurrence of a crisis would have an amplifying effect over the risk levels.
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DeltaCoVaR(5)
Figure 1: DeltaCoVaR(5) quarterly means series
Shaded areas: recessive periods
Vertical lines: financial crises
The relation between recessive periods and financial crisis is more com-
plex than it seems. It would appear that financial crises are random events,
as prior theories before Allen and Gale (2000) suggested, and that financial
crises produce recessions and not the opposite. This relation can be clarified
using the model of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009), in which the financial
system stability depends on the economic cycle, but the cycles in turn are
amplified by the financial sector activity. For example, if investors observe a
deceleration they anticipate a recession, reacting immediately and dispropor-
tionately, causing a financial crisis that make the deceleration worse, finally
ending in recession.
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3.2. Determinants of systemic risk variables
The variables must be the ones that the theory suggests are related to
systemic risk. I use specific variables for each of the identified determinants,
excepting for the interconnections structure of the banks (how much diver-
sified are the assets and liabilities of the banks). All these variables were
collected from the FDIC and Federal Reserve databases.
Loan to deposit ratio. Illiquidity index. The higher the ratio the highest
the iliquidity of the bank, because assets (illiquid, long term) would be much
more than liabilities (liquid, short term), so the banks might not have enough
liquidity to cover any unforeseen fund requirements, being vulnerable to
liquidity shocks. The relation with systemic risk should be positive. This
variable is abbreviated as illiquidity.
Tier 1 capital ratio. An inverse leverage index that can be understood
as a financial strength index. It is the tier 1 capital as a percent of risk-
weighted assets. Tier 1 capital includes: common equity plus noncumulative
perpetual preferred stock plus minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries
less goodwill and other ineligible intangible assets. Since this ratio is an
inverse leverage index, the relation with systemic risk should be negative,
because the higher the ratio the more stable the banks returns and the less
prone the banks to financial insolvency. This variable is abbreviated as
strength index.
Average assets (ln). This variable is a measure of size. It is the average
between the current total assets and the previous. The relation with systemic
risk should be positive, because the larger the bank the larger the losses for
the system if the bank goes bankrupt. Besides, banks that have grown also
have developed a greater number of interconnections, so can transmit risk
to a larger number of banks.
Leading index. Business cycle variable constructed by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. The leading index predicts the six month growth rate
of the coincident index, which in turn is a variable that summarizes current
economic conditions in a single statistic. A positive change (growth) is a
positive signal for depositors, who will be less prone to react generating
liquidity shocks, and vice versa. The relation with systemic risk should be
negative.
3.3. Control variables
Control variables are used to reduce the omitted variable bias and for
establishing more appropriately if there is a causal effect of determinants
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over the dependent variable. If the regressions have no other variables that
could have some effect over the dependent variable, there will be a bias
(positive or negative) in the coefficients estimates for determinants. I use
the following control variables:
Noninterest income to assets. Income derived from bank services and
sources other than interest bearing assets as a percent of average assets. In
general are incomes from fees, and allow the bank to assure liquidity when
the default rates are increased. The relation with systemic risk should be
negative.
Return on assets, ROA. Net income after taxes as a percent of average
total assets. Financial theory suggests a positive relation between risk and
return: the higher the return the higher the risk, but (in the medium term)
more profitable banks should have an easier access to financing when they
require it. The relation with systemic risk is not clear.
Credit loss provision to net charge-offs. Provision for possible credit and
allocated transfer risk as a percent of net charge-offs. Provision is the amount
saved for expected losses and net charge-offs is the amount actually lost. If
the ratio is high the effective losses would have been less than the expected.
The relation with systemic risk should be negative, since it is a good signal
to depositors.
Change in the S&P500. Percentage change in the S&P500 index from the
previous period. It should be a positive signal for depositors, since this index
would reflect the investors’ expectations about the economy. However, it also
could imply deviating funds from the banking system to capital markets. The
relation with systemic risk is not clear.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
DeltaCoVaR(5) 35160 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0049 0.0101
Iliquidity 28150 0.9004 0.2287 0.0000 4.8298
Strength index 28156 0.1325 0.1328 -0.0266 10.0030
ln(Size) 28156 13.8928 1.6360 7.8984 21.3607
Leading index 33179 0.9079 1.0142 -2.8900 2.3300
Noninterest income/assets 28156 0.0299 0.0160 -0.6351 0.4769
ROA 28156 0.0082 0.0144 -0.4758 0.1650
Provision/net charge-offs 27146 2.4279 44.6633 -3,615 1,754
DeltaSP500 33179 1.3479 6.7475 -27.2000 12.9000
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the systemic risk variable,
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determinants and control variables.
4. Methodology: Identifying the determinants of systemic risk
I used dynamic panel data regressions because they allow controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables, decreasing the bias in the
coefficient estimates. The generic model is:
yit = αi + φ1yit−1 + ...+ φpyit−p + x′itβ + εit
Where the dependent variable yit is the systemic risk measure ∆CoV aRit;
αi is a fixed effect, that captures the effect of omitted variables that are as-
sumed constant over time but not across banks, like the bank’s management
style (managers’ degree of risk aversion). The lagged dependent variables
capture the effect of omitted variables varying in time and across banks, as
Angrist and Pischke (2008) explain. For example, the number of intercon-
nections of a bank, which could increase as the bank grows, making it risky
for the system; xit are the determinants and control variables: the observable
characteristics.
The estimation of this model is inconsistent because the introduction of
the lagged dependent variable, so the right strategy to estimate the coeffi-
cients is using the first differences model and the Arellano-Bond estimator.
∆yit = φ1∆yit−1 + ...+ φp∆yit−p + ∆x′itβ + ∆εit
Given that T is large, many instruments are available, so the Arellano-
Bond estimator was implemented using the two-step GMM estimator, given
that the model is overidentified and this method allows a more efficient es-
timation.The determinants and control variables were treated as exogenous,
so they were used as instruments for themselves. The number of instruments
for the lagged dependent variables of each regression was chosen using a test
of over-identifying restrictions (Sargan Test). The number of lags for the
dependent variable was chosen to assure that εit is serially uncorrelated.
I analyze two regressions: a short one, which includes only the determi-
nant variables of systemic risk, and a long one, which also includes control
variables. In this way the causality of the relations encountered will be estab-
lished more robustly, since the short regression estimation could be biased
(omitted variable bias). Additionally, I use clustered robust standard errors.
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The dependent variable is measured on a scale that is difficult to inter-
pret, because its small values (in percentage points, with a mean equal to
0.0010) are reflected in small coefficients. It seems that the estimates are not
economically significant. To address this problem I also show the results of
regressions with standardized variables (within each group). An advantage
of standardization is that regardless the measurement units of the original
variables, coefficients are comparable. Therefore, the magnitude of coeffi-
cients points out what variables have more importance over systemic risk
determination.
5. Results
Table 5 shows the estimation results. Columns (1) and (2) show the
results for the regression using the original variables. The coefficients of the
lagged dependent variables sum 0.5351 in the short regression and 0.5568 in
the long regression, showing that a great fraction of the contemporaneous
risk depends on past risk. The number of interconnections of a bank is a
relevant omitted variable varying in time, so its effect could be being reflected
in these coefficients.
There is a positive relation between systemic risk and illiquidity, only
significant in the long regression. A greater strength index (less leverage) is
associated negatively with systemic risk, but its effect is only significant at
the 10% level in the long regression.
The size effect over systemic risk is almost zero in both regressions, prob-
ably because the scale of measurement of the dependent variable, so this
relation will be better analyzed using the regressions with standardized vari-
ables. The same is valid for the leading index, since the results do not allow
getting sound conclusions.
Among the control variables, only ROA and deltaSP500 were significant
at the 1% level. The effect of ROA over systemic risk is negative and the
DeltaSP500 effect is positive but close to zero.
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for the regressions using standard-
ized variables. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables sum 0.5118
in the short regression and 0.5347 in the long regression, nearly the same
as the previous results. There is a positive relation between systemic risk
and illiquidity, significant at the 1% level in both regressions, and a negative
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Table 5: Results: dynamic panel estimates
Columns (1) and (2): original variables
Columns (3) and (4): standardized variables
Dependent variable: DeltaCoV aR(5)it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.DeltaCoVaR(5) 0.5363∗∗∗ 0.5172∗∗∗ 0.4402∗∗∗ 0.4034∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
L2.DeltaCoVaR(5) -0.1631∗∗∗ -0.1141∗∗∗ -0.0569∗∗∗ -0.0096
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2920)
L3.DeltaCoVaR(5) 0.1619∗∗∗ 0.1537∗∗∗ 0.1285∗∗∗ 0.1409∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Iliquidity 0.0002 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.1238∗∗∗ 0.1082∗∗∗
(0.1480) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Strength index -0.0001 -0.0001∗ -0.0331∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗
(0.6070) (0.0870) (0.0500) (0.0050)
ln(Size) -0.0001∗ 0.0000∗∗ -0.1083∗∗∗ -0.0917∗∗∗
(0.0810) (0.0110) (0.0000) (0.0010)
Leading index -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ -0.2517∗∗∗ -0.0154
(0.0000) (0.0050) (0.0000) (0.2580)
Noninterest income/assets -0.0005 0.0006
(0.1150) (0.9650)
ROA -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0215∗
(0.0040) (0.0590)
Provision/net charge-offs 0.0000 0.0109∗
(0.6250) (0.0820)
DeltaSP500 0.0000∗∗∗ -0.3090∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.0011∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗ 0.0022
(0.0480) (0.0010) (0.0390) (0.5640)
Obs 25,780 24,615 25,764 24,606
Banks 589 586 587 584
Wald chi2 1095.51 5974.53 6337.27 4737.73
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of instruments 605 534 605 609
p values in parenthesis
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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relation with the strength index, significant at 5% and 1% level in the short
and long regression, respectively2.
The size effect over systemic risk is negative and significant in both re-
gressions, the opposite of the expected, however, some authors like Freixas
et al. (2000) and Chan-Lau (2010) suggest that more important than size
(too-big-to-fail) is how interconnected is a bank (too-connected-to-fail), so
the results obtained for this variable would be explained by the inclusion of
the lagged dependent variables, which capture in part the effect of intercon-
nections, that are assumed related with size. The negative effect encountered
for size could be explained due to the fact that larger institutions can get
funding easier, as well as can bear larger losses for longer periods than smaller
institutions.
On the other hand, a positive relation between size and systemic risk
could be expected, due to the way the dependent variable is constructed.
Financial system VaR (and ∆CoV aR) is constructed on the basis of the
distribution of returns on the total market-valued financial assets, which in
turn is generated by taking the average market-valued asset returns of each
bank, weighted by the lagged market-valued total assets. However, Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2009) argue that ∆CoV aR is not always higher for larger
banks, since also small banks could have high levels of systemic risk when
they are banks acting like a herd, that is, when many small banks of simi-
lar characteristics are affected by some common factor that simultaneously
causes losses in all the banks (thus the loss of the system is large). For
example, a crisis in the real estate sector will affect simultaneously all the
banks financing the sector.
The leading index variable has a negative effect over systemic risk, be-
cause an increase in the variable’s value is a good signal for investors. The
effect is significant at the 1% level only in the short regression. In the long
regression the leading index has not a significant effect due to the inclusion
of the DeltaSP500 variable, which would be more important than the leading
index in the creation of depositors’ expectations.
Among the control variables, ROA has a negative and significant effect
at the 10% level over systemic risk; Provision/net charge-offs has a negative
effect, as expected, significant at the 10% level; and finally the DeltaSP500
2The differences in significance are explained by the way of standardization, within
each group (alternatively it could have been performed using pooled data) and by the
number of instruments used in each regression, chosen according to the Sargan test.
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variable was significant at the 1% level. The effect is negative, because an
increase in the index should be a positive signal for depositors, since this
index would reflect in part the investors’ expectations about the economy,
so the systemic risk should be decreasing.
The most important determinant in coefficient magnitude was the lagged
dependent variable followed by DeltaSP500 (which would be replacing the
leading index variable in its role of business cycle signal), the iliquidity vari-
able, size and finally the strength index.
In conclusion, the results obtained from regressions depend on the type
of structure assumed for the omitted variables. An important variable like
the interconnections structure of a bank is omitted, however, since the de-
pendent variable is the risk of the system caused by an individual institution,
the variations in the interconnections structure of each institution (variation
over time and across banks) could be captured using lags of the dependent
variable, so the dynamic panel data model should deliver reliable results.
The relations estimated were consistent with the theory, so the model must
be correctly specified.
6. Duration of the financial stability
Using the systemic risk variable and its determinants, it is possible to
characterize the duration of financial stability. For that purpose, the first
step is defining financial stability and instability states, as a function of the
risk variable. The unstable state is a high risk state (financial distress), when
systemic risk is greater than an arbitrary limit, while the stable state is a
state in which risk is less than the limit. I have established two limits: (1)
the mean of the quarterly averages series (0.0010), (2) 75th percentile of the
quarterly averages distribution (0.0012).
Table 6 shows the means for the variables in each state defined by limit
1, the differences between means, and tests for significance of the differences.
Table 7 shows the same information for the states defined by limit 2. The
results of the tests were the same in both tables. The systemic risk is higher in
the unstable state, by definition. The illiquidity mean is higher in the stable
state, the opposite of the expected. There are no significant differences
in the strength index. The banks in the instability state are significantly
larger. The leading index is higher in the stable state, so there are better
economic conditions in stability periods. The Noninterest income to assets
variable that is a measure of liquidity, is higher in the instable state, the
opposite of the expected. ROA is higher in the instability state. There
16
Table 6: Means by state (limit 1) and Test for differences
Variable Instability Stability Difference S.E.(diff.) t-test
DeltaCoVaR(5) 0.0018 0.0003 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0000 206.0357
Iliquidity 0.8925 0.9048 -0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0029 -4.2874
Strength index 0.1320 0.1327 -0.0007 0.0020 -0.3439
ln(Size) 14.5362 13.5380 0.9982∗∗∗ 0.0218 45.8051
Leading index 0.8758 0.9274 -0.0515∗∗∗ 0.0118 -4.3741
N.I. income/assets 0.0308 0.0294 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0002 6.0632
ROA 0.0092 0.0077 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0002 8.1125
Prov./net charge-offs 2.2144 2.5467 -0.3323 0.6338 -0.5243
DeltaSP500 1.0997 1.4992 -0.3995∗∗∗ 0.0783 -5.1027
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7: Means by state (limit 2) and Test for differences
Variable Instability Stability Difference S.E.(diff.) t-test
DeltaCoVaR(5) 0.0020 0.0004 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0000 202.8072
Iliquidity 0.8931 0.9035 -0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0030 -3.4171
Strength index 0.1323 0.1325 -0.0002 0.0024 -0.0762
ln(Size) 14.6732 13.5684 1.1048∗∗∗ 0.0241 45.8788
Leading index 0.8747 0.9233 -0.0486∗∗∗ 0.0125 -3.8952
N.I. income/assets 0.0308 0.0295 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0002 5.2649
ROA 0.0093 0.0078 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0002 8.2456
Prov./net charge-offs 2.4180 2.4321 -0.0141 0.6821 -0.0206
DeltaSP500 1.0504 1.4859 -0.4355∗∗∗ 0.0829 -5.2566
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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are no differences in the Provision/Net charge-offs variable, and finally, the
DeltaSP500 is higher in the stable state, reflecting better expectations about
the economy in stable periods.
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DeltaCoVaR(5)
Figure 2: Sample division in states
Superior horizontal line: 75th percentile of quarterly averages distribution (0.0012)
Inferior horizontal line: Mean of quarterly averages (0.0010)
Shaded areas: recessive periods
Vertical lines: financial crises
Figure 2 shows the division between states through horizontal lines.
Banks alternate stability and instability periods, so once the origin of each
stable period is identified, the duration is the number of periods between the
origin of a stable period and the period in which transition to the unstable
period occurs. In this period the bank is at risk (time at risk) since there is
the possibility of suffering a transition to the unstable state3. Next I describe
some basic concepts about this methodology as well as the Cox proportional
hazard model, which allows characterizing the duration of financial stability
periods as a function of risk determinants4.
The duration in a state is a nonnegative random variable, which measures
3To clarify nomenclature: the variable of interest is the duration or permanence in a
state before moving to another state, that is, the time spent in a given state. A state is
a classification of an individual at a point in time, and transition is the movement from
one state to another.
4The methodology description is based on Kiefer (1988) and Cameron and Trivedi
(2005).
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periods of time, and is denoted T . The cumulative distribution function
of T is denoted F (t) and the density function is denoted f(t). Then the
probability that the duration is less than t is:
F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t)
=
∫ t
0
f(s)ds
In addition, the survivor function is the probability that duration equals
or exceeds t:
S(t) = Pr(T > t)
= 1− F (t)
The hazard function is the instantaneous probability of leaving a state
conditional on survival to time t. In other words, it is the instantaneous
probability of moving to a financial instability state given having been t
periods in the stable state:
λ(t) = lim
dt→0
Pr(t ≤ T < t+ dt | T ≥ t)
dt
=
f(t)
S(t)
There are two concepts of time in this type of models. The first is date,
or how time is measured in the database (quarters), and the second one is
the time under analysis or time at risk, which is denoted t. If all durations
begin in the same period (same origin) both concepts would be the same,
and durations would be being measured in real time, however, durations in
this paper are being measured from different origins, so the relevant concept
of time is t, the time at risk, and not real time.
In the Cox proportional hazard model interest is in the conditional hazard
rate, λ(t | x), unlike other regressions approaches in which interest is in the
conditional mean function, E(T | x). This model assumes that the hazard
rate is heterogeneous: vary across institutions, but it is proportional to a
baseline hazard. Therefore, the conditional hazard rate can be factored into
separate functions:
λ(t | x, β) = λ0(t) exp(x, β)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, which is function of t (time at risk)
alone, while exp(x, β) is function of x alone (the regressors: the determinants
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of systemic risk). All conditional hazard functions are proportional to the
baseline hazard, with a scale factor exp(x, β) that is not an explicit function
of t. In practice, the baseline hazard is not estimated but can be recovered
after estimation of β, evaluating the hazard function at x = 0.
The original sample includes a total of 35,160 observations (720 insti-
tutions), between 1986Q1 and 2010Q4, however, it only includes regressors
since 1992Q1. Besides, in the duration analysis only matters transition from
the stable state to the unstable one, so the observations in the unstable state
are irrelevant for estimation, implying that about a 40% of the sample is not
used.
This type of models allows using censored durations, that is, durations
which origin or end is unknown. This is not a problem since the likelihood
function considers censoring. On the other hand, it uses an identification
variable for durations rather than banks, but the robust errors are clustered
by banks, the original identification variable.
Table 6 shows the results of estimations. Columns (1) and (2) show
the results for regressions with risk limit equal to the mean of quarterly
averages, while columns (3) and (4) show the results for regressions with
risk limit equal to the 75th percentile of quarterly averages distribution. It
must be noted that when the limit of risk is higher (75th percentile) fewer
observations and banks are excluded of the sample but the total sum of
durations and transitions is smaller.
For both states definitions, coefficients for variables illiquidity and strength
index had the expected signs (relations), but are not significant. The hazard
rate is positively related with size and negatively related with the leading
index. Both relations are significant at the 1% level. Saying that a variable
has a positive effect over the hazard rate is equivalent to say that it increases
the transition probability to an instability state or that it produces a fall in
the survivor function, and vice versa. So banks with larger size have a higher
transition probability to an instability state, and when the leading index is
positive, indicating good economic conditions, the transition probability to
an instability state drops.
The differences in coefficients magnitude are small when comparing the
short and long regressions, so the bias of estimates must be small too. Un-
like the determinants analysis, the DeltaSP500 had not a significant effect
over transition probability, while the leading index was a better measure of
expectations.
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Table 8: Results: Cox proportional hazard model
Columns (1) and (2): risk limit is the mean of quarterly averages
Columns (3) and (4): risk limit is the 75th percentile of quarterly averages distribution
Dependent variable: time at risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Iliquidity 0.2214 0.2082 0.1523 0.1269
(0.2330) (0.2700) (0.4500) (0.5490)
Strength index -1.0481 -1.5798 -0.0276 -0.8600
(0.3140) (0.2060) (0.9760) (0.4810)
ln(Size) 0.20171∗∗∗ 0.20251∗∗∗ 0.21271∗∗∗ 0.23061∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Leading index -0.12201∗∗∗ -0.13331∗∗∗ -0.22121∗∗∗ -0.21501∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Noninterest income/assets -1.5641 1.9447
(0.7260) (0.6570)
ROA 5.41731∗ 6.08781∗
(0.0860) (0.0730)
Provision/net charge-offs 0.0013 0.00221∗∗
(0.1580) (0.0460)
DeltaSP500 0.0000 -0.0046
(0.9940) (0.5130)
Durations 1027 1004 952 932
Transitions 642 613 529 499
Banks 467 466 500 500
N 17,740 17,045 19,446 18,686
Wald 84.02 91.90 95.38 102.87
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ln L -4,100.49 -3,878.54 -3,326.55 -3,103.41
p values in parenthesis
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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7. Expected duration as a leading index for systemic risk
The following analysis illustrates the effect of determinants over the ex-
pected duration of a bank, using the results of regression (1). The objective is
to analyze the effect of a negative change in the leading index, which should
be understood by depositors as a negative signal about business cycle, and
should generate liquidity shocks over the banks, increasing systemic risk.
The survivor function of a bank can be constructed on the basis of the
hazard rate, and then calculate the expected duration in financial stability.
The concept to analyze is the expected future lifetime, that is the expected
value of future lifetime. The probability of transition at time t + t0 given
survival until time t0 is:
Pr (T ≤ t0 + t | T > t0) = Pr (t0 < T ≤ t0 + t)
S(t0)
=
F (t0 + t)− F (t0)
S(t0)
The probability density of future lifetime is:
d
dt
F (t0 + t)− F (t0)
S(t0)
=
f(t0 + t)
S(t0)
So the expected future lifetime is:
1
S(t0)
∫ ∞
0
tf(t+ t0)dt =
1
S(t0)
∫ ∞
0
S(t)dt
When t0 = 0, that is when a stability state is starting, the expression is
the expected lifetime, or the stability state expected duration:∫ ∞
0
tf(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
S(t)dt
For a bank with all its determinants in the mean of the sample, the
expected duration is 33 quarters (survivor 1, figure 3). The mean for the
leadix index is 0.92, which is a good economic condition. If the leading index
falls up to -0.50, reflecting a bad economic condition, the expected duration
falls until 27 quarters (survivor 2, figure 3). The survivor function depends
on banks characteristics, so there is one different survivor function for each
bank, and if the characteristics (determinants) change the survivor function
changes too. The expected survivor is conditional on time at risk, so the
expected values are conditional in both: characteristics of banks and time
at risk.
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Figure 3: Survivor function
Change in the survivor function when the leading index falls
Solid line: Survivor 1; Leading index = 0.92
Dashed line: Survivor 2; Leading index = -0.50
The expected duration measures the expected number of periods until the
bank experiments a transition to an instable state. In others word, when the
bank reaches a level of systemically dangerous risk (which has been defined
previously).
Table 9 shows the expected duration for different starting periods, t0.
When t0 = 0, the result is the expected duration. When t0 > 0 the result is
the expected future duration, the expected duration conditional on survival
until time t0.
For a bank that has survived 10 periods and is having all its determinants
in the mean of the sample, the expected future duration is 69 quarters (sur-
vivor 1, figure 3). If the leading index falls as before, the expected duration
falls until 65 quarters (survivor 2, figure 3).
A regulatory body like the central bank could monitor the banks expected
duration of financial stability, paying particular attention to banks which
expected duration is too low (or rapidly falling period to period) to take
preventive measures, for example, injecting liquidity to banks in troubles
or to the system as a whole (as a lender of last resort), thus avoiding that
the spread of a shock affecting a particular bank could turn into financial
contagion, that in turn could affect a larger share of the financial system.
Finally, I must point out that this probability model is a reduced-form
model, which implies that each time a policy is executed the structural pa-
rameters of the model changes, but the reduced-form model does not capture
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Table 9: Expected durations
Leadix = Leading Index
Leadix1 = 0.92 Leadix2 = -0.50
t_0 E(t|T > t_0) E(t|T > t_0) ∆ %∆
0 33.1418 26.8348 6.3070 0.2350
1 43.5268 37.2696 6.2572 0.1679
2 53.4938 47.7820 5.7118 0.1195
3 58.1433 52.8303 5.3130 0.1006
4 62.6916 57.8495 4.8420 0.0837
5 64.9955 60.4210 4.5745 0.0757
6 66.1350 61.6998 4.4352 0.0719
7 66.5989 62.2218 4.3771 0.0703
8 67.9561 63.7530 4.2031 0.0659
9 68.6465 64.5343 4.1122 0.0637
10 69.0006 64.9357 4.0649 0.0626
the policy structural effect, so must be re-estimated (Lucas critique). An ex-
ample is the moral hazard problem that arises when the central bank acts
rescuing banks in troubles to avoid the financial contagion. Since banks
know that will be rescued by the central bank if they are facing problems,
then respond taking a larger amount of risk, because they will receive the
profits but not the costs of the risk, which will be assumed by the central
bank. Concerning this problem authors like Freixas et al. (2000) and Stern
and Feldman (2004) argue in favor of a bail-out policy, since they indicate
that the cost of financial contagion (in economic welfare) is greater than the
cost of moral hazard.
8. Conclusions
Summarizing, I analyzed the determinants of risk using dynamic panel
data regressions because they allow controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
and omitted variables, decreasing the bias in the coefficient estimates. The
key assumption is that the lagged dependent variables capture the effect
of omitted variables varying in time and across banks, like the number of
interconnections of a bank, which could increase as the bank grows, making
it risky for the system.
The results obtained from regressions were consistent with theory, so
the model must be correctly specified. The most important determinant in
coefficient magnitude was the lagged dependent variable (positive effect over
systemic risk) followed by deltaSP500 (negative effect; it acts as a business
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cycle signal), the iliquidity variable (positive effects), size (negative effect)
and finally the strength index (negative effect).
The size effect over systemic risk was negative and significant, the op-
posite of the expected, however, some authors like Freixas et al. (2000) and
Chan-Lau (2010) suggest that more important than size (too-big-to-fail) is
how interconnected is a bank (too-connected-to-fail), so the results obtained
for this variable would be explained by the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variables, which capture in part the effect of interconnections, which are as-
sumed related with size. The negative effect encountered for size could be
explained due to the fact that larger institutions can get funding easier, as
well as can bear larger losses for longer periods than smaller institutions.
The duration analysis of financial stability revealed that the determi-
nants of systemic risk play the same role in the duration of stability states,
but the significant variables were only the size of a bank (which is related
with the number of interconnections), and the business cycle variable, acting
through depositors’ expectations. Because the business cycle variables play a
fundamental role in stability duration, the central bank effort for stabilizing
the business cycle would have an important effect over the cycle of financial
stability/instability.
The survivor function of a bank is constructed on the basis of the hazard
rate, and then the expected duration is calculated. A financial regulator
like the central bank could monitor the expected duration of stability, pay-
ing particular attention to banks with a low expected duration (or rapidly
decaying expected duration) to take preventive measures, for example, in-
jecting liquidity into troubled banks or the whole financial system (acting
as a lender of last resort), avoiding the emergence of a contagion which may
end affecting a larger fraction of the financial system. Consequently, the
expected duration of financial stability of an institution could be a leading
index for systemic risk.
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